After decades of institutional reform, the financial banking system in China is now demonstrating a unique character, posing a challenge to the traditional theory in this regard. The paper tends to present a review of the relevant process and mechanism behind. Against the special background of the decline in fiscal revenue and and the accompanying desire for growth at the beginning, the financial reform was caught from the very outset in a dilemma of financial marketization and financial control. The major resultant problem is the risk commitment having to be made, thus dictating the nature of the marketization reform to be controlled and limited. This distinction, together with the actually successful performance of the state-owned banking system, is portrayed as“failure yet efficiency”by the mainstream academia. In the paper, the writer believes that the state-owned banking system has an outstanding comparative advantage to the rise of a big economy; it is not only important to recognize the advantage but also theoretically valuable to look into the relevant institutional connotation hiding behind the phenomenon and its financial performance.